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CHAPTER I

The so-called gold reserve was not as Its name indicates a
reserve at all until late in the nineteenth century.

It was, at

first, simply the annual balance of gold in the Treasury.

It was

not, as sometimes stated, a fund pledged to redeem the legaltender United States notes.

In reality it was on.y a part of the

available cash, and. the proportion and character of the fund
depended only on the practice of the Treasury from time to time.
In 1861 specie payments were suspended.

The people began to

withdraw their money for hoarding and the specie reserve was
dwindling rapidly.

The war crisis and tn.e suspension of specie

payments soon rendered the currency system of the country quite
inadequate.

To meet the stringency, the Treasury began issuing

United States legal-tender notes.

The first of these non-interest

bearing legal-ten er notes was authorized by an act of Congress
February 12, 1862 and were issued March 10, 1862.

These notes

were legal tender for all debts public and private, except duties
or imposts, and. interest on the public debt.

They were exchange

able for United States six per-cent bonds and redeemable at the
pleasure of the United States after five years.1
On June 7, 1862 the Secretary of the Treasury recommended a
further issue of legal-tender notes to supply the need of more
currency.

A bill authorizing the additional issue of $150,000,000.
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legal-tender notes was signed by the President June 11, 1862.
The act of '“arch 3, 1863 authorized a further issue of 5150,000,000,
bringing the aggregate issue up to $450,000#

The

highest

amount of legal-tender notes outstanding at any one time was on
January 3, 1864, amounting at that time to $449,338,902.

This

sum included legal tender notes, fractional currency, and short
term interest bearing notes.^
It was not expected that the notes issued would stay in cir
culation permanently since all non-interest bearing notes issued,
with the exeption of fractional currency, were convertible into
six per cent bonds.

In his report for 1865 Secretary of the

Treasury McCulloch expressed th.

opinion that the legal tender

acts were war measures and ought not to remain in force any longer
than should be necessary to enable the people to prepare for a
return to the gold standard.
The greenbacks continued in circulation, however, and the
currency situation was becoming troublesome.

Paper money

depreciated rapidly and coin was already out of circulation.

To

correct this evil the Secretary of the Treasury recommended the
retirement of the greenbacks to contract the volume of currency,
and Congress, by the act of ^arch 12, 1866, authorized the retire
ment and cancellation of ten millions of legal tencer notes
within six months of the passage of the act.

Under this act the

amount outstanding was reduced to $356,000,000 on December 31,
1867.

Between that date and January 15, 1874 the amount
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increased to $382,979,815 and on June 20, 1874 the maximum amount
outstanding was fixed by law at $382,000,000,3
Besides these United States legal-tender notes there were in
circulation millions of national bank notes*

Section 3 of the

act of January 14, 1875, authorized the increase of national bank
notes but required the Secretary of the Treasury to retire
legal-tender "greenbacks” to an amount equal to eighty per-cent
of the national bank notes issued, until the amount of greenbacks
outstanding should be $300,000,000.

This act was repealed in

the Silver Purchase and Coinage act of 1878.

Up to that year

#35,318,984 legal-tender notes were retired, leaving in circula
tion $346,681,016.

Prom May 31, 1878 the Secretary of the

Treasury was required to re-issue any legal-tender United States
notes received in the Treasury.^
On April 25, 1870 the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted
a bill to Congress providing for the revision of the coinage laws
of the united States*

It was considered for- five sessions of

Congress and It finally became a law February 12, 1873.

This act

provided that the Unit of value of United States currency should
be the gold dollar.

It also provided that the silver coins

should be a trade dollar of 420 grains Troy, a half dollar,
quarter, etc.

All silver coins were made legal-tender to the

amount of five dollars.

The act also provided that the silver

dollars previously coined, of which there were but few In
existence, maintained their legal-tender qualities, but the
coinage of new full legal-tender dollars was discontinued.5
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There was at first complete acquiescence in the result of
this legislation, and. not until the decline of silver in 1875
and 1876 were any suggestions made for
silver dollars.

he further coinage of

In both these years the currency of the country

was inconvertible paper and no gold or silver coins were in cir
culation.

Strong agitation for the use of silver as coin, both in

and out of Congress, especially in the silver producing west and
in the south, was carried on through the years 1876, 1877, and
1878.

John Sherman, then Secretary of the Treasury, in citing the

current silver problem in his report of 1877, came out In favor of
the use of silver as coin but only within certain limitations.

He

warned the country against the dangers of free coinage and recom
mended limited coinage from bullion purchased by the government on
the open market, maintaining it by redemption, or otherwise, at
par with gold coin.

He said in effect that if the silver dollar

was restored to our coin ge it would add to the convenience of the
people, but should be coined under the same ruins as to issue and
convertibility as other forms of money.

The United States could

not fix the market price of silver alone, as its price is in
fluenced byall nations who use t e metal.^

Silver Legislation in 1878
The agitation for trie coinage of silver continued.

The two

factions leading the fight were the Inflationists, who clamored
for the coinage of silver because it would bring more and cheaper
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money, and the silver producers of the west whose main purpose
was to create a market for their silver.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the veto of the president, an act for the coinage of
silver dollars was passed by Congress February 28, 1878,7
In analyzing the causes of the passage of the act of 1378 it
will be found that it 'was passed through the efforts of the silver
producers, mho united their efforts with the true inflationists.
During the summer of 1876 a number of silver bills came up
in the House.

On July 18, 1876 W. D» Kelley introduced a bill to

coin standard silver dollars and to restore their legal-tender
Q
character.
A similar bill was introduced by Bland of Missouri
July 25, 1876.
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At the next session Bland reported his original

bill from the committee on mines and mining.

This bill was

introduced December 12, 1876 and was the same as that introduced
by Kelley.117

The following autumn the Kelley bill, containing a

free coinage clause, was again brought up by Bland.

It passed

without debate November 5, 1877 by a vote of 163 to 44, and was
sent to the Senate.
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In the Senate the hill was In charge of Allison of the
finance committee.

Allison reported the bill with Important

amendments, the chief of which was the striking out of the provi
sion granting free coinage, and the bill was made the special
order for December 11, 1877, and thereafter it received full
debate.

The free coinage provision was struck out and a clause

directing the government purchase and coinage of not less than
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$2,000,000 worth and not more than

'4,000,000 worth per month

was inserted by a vote of 49 to 22.

The silver men were strong

for full coinage, hut yielded, after fighting the proposed
measure, because it was better than none.

1p

The discussion and delate then centered on the price of
silver and the amount of silver in the dollar.

Senator Bcoth ,

of California, ihtroduced an important amendement regarding silver
certificates which passed 49-15.

The whole bill as amended

passed the Senate February 15, 1878 by a vote of 48-21.13
The bill, as amended by the Senate, without the free coinage
clause, proved unsatisfactory to the silver faction in the House.
There were many protests but the belief was expressed by the
advocates of silver that It would be well to take what they could
get.

At some time in the future they coula try to gain more

ground.

A vote on the bill was taken and it passed by 202 to 72.

The bill was then sent to the President, who vetoed it February
28, 1878.

In his veto message President H yes expressed his

objections in the following argument.

He held that neither the

interest of the people nor of the government woulc. be promoted by
disparaging silver as one o: the two metals which furnished the
coinageof the world. He favored silver coinage only when the
intrinsic value of gold and silver would be as nearly equal as
their relative c q ,mercial values would permit.

If a country was

to be benefitted by silver coinage, he sale, it could be done only
by the issue of silver dollars of full value, which would defraud
no man.

A currency worth less than it purports to be would
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In the end defraud both the creditor and the debtor.
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In comparing the President’s objections with the provisions
of the bill it will be found that they do not coincide with its
provisions.

He was in favor of silver coinage, but only with the

condition that full value dollars be coined.

It was shown time

and again by Treasury officials that it would be a disadvantage
to coin silver dollars of full value because of their si?,e.
Furthermore, the dollar provided in the act would defraud no one,
as the President feared, since it and its representative, the
silver certificate with which the coin was interchangeable, was
:
avowed by the bill to be receivable for all debts.

In reality the

main objection to the bill was that It contained restrictions as
to the total amount of silver dollars coined, and this later
proved to be its chief objection.

President Hayes vetoed the

bill, however, and It was passed over his veto on the same day by
a vote of 196 to 73 in the House and 46 to 19 in the Senate.1*'
The act

>rovid.ed for the monthlu purchase and coinage, by

the government, of not less tnan $2,000,000 nor more than
$4,000,000 of silver bullion anc- that the silver so coined should
be legal-tender at their nominal value, for all debts and dues,
public and private, except where otherwise stipulated, in the
contract.
Just when the countries of the Latin Union, accustomed as
they had been to silver, preferred not to give up gold, and had
wholly ceased coining silver in 1878, the United States undertook
the task of saving silver for the benefit of the silver producers.
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The price of silver fell steadily after 1876 and the ratio of
silver to gold was also falling.

Not a mint in Europe dared open

its doors to silver, but the United States alone came forward in
an attempt to uphold the value of silver.
The Bland act was put into effect Ira: ediately.
may be studied from the chart on the following page.

Its operation
It can be

seen from the chart that the circulation of silver dollars was
relatively small, $65,000,000 was the highest point reached.
Besides bringing back the coinage of the silver dollar, the act
also Introduced the silver certi icate into our currency.

Section

3 of the act provided that any holder of the coin autho ized by
t lis act might deposit the same with the Treasury or any assistant
Treasurer of the United States, in sums not less than ten dollars,
and receive silver certificates.

‘
I'hese certificates were receivable

for customs, taxes, and all public dues.

While they were not full

legol tender, they were received equally with silver dollars
because of their convenience and if refused they could readily be
exchanged for silver dollars.

It was only by the use of these

silver certificates t iat any considerable amount of silver could
be kept in circulation.
The Bland act produced an important effect upon our coinage
system.

The law itself clearly showed that while the silver

dollar was not to supersede the gold dollar, Congress ap eared
ready to adopt abimetalllc standard of silver and gold of equal
value and purchasing power.

The Bland act limited the amount of

silver dollars coined each month, but it did not limit the total
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amount nor the period of time during which that coinage was to
continue.

The market value of the silver in the dollar, at the

date of the passage of the act, was 93-| cents in goldj in November
1873 it was about 86 cents.

As the process of coining silver

progressed, the silver dollars began piling up in the Treasury
while the value of silver bullion declined.

The Secretary of the

Treasury had predicted that this condition would arise.

In his

report of 1878 he said*
"It was no doubt the intention of Congress to
provide a coin in silver which would answer a multi
tude of purposes of business life, without banishing
from circulation the established gold coin of the
country.
To accomplish this it is lndispensible
either that the silver coin be limited in amount or
that its bullion value be equal to that of the gold
dollar.
If not its use will be limited to domestic
purposes.”10
Silver coin coul

not be exported, as gold could, at its

commercial value in bullion, and if issued in excess of demands
for domestic purposes, it would fall in market value and would
finally become the sole coin of standard value.
known fact that when two

It is a well

urrencies, both legal tender, are issued

without limit the cheaper one, alone, will circulate.

if, however,

the issue of the cheaper money is limited to an amount demanded
for circulation, it will not depreciate since its current use
will keep it at par.
In a few years following the passage of the act of 1878,
distrust of silver money was marked.

°.ilver accumulated in the

Treasury almost as fast as it came from the mints.

Much of the

silver put into circulation was in the form of silver certificates,
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but as these certificates were exchangeable for gold, they were
soon returned to the Treasury.

Besides this, muc h of the silver

put into circulation was finding its way back into the Treasury
through the revenue channels being now receivable for customs,
dues and taxes.

Thus the only effect of the attem t on the part

of the Treasury to circulate silver was to diminish the gold
supply.
The total coinage of silver dollars under the Bland act
amounted to $378,166,793.

Since under that act the government

was required to coin at least 2,000,000 silver dollars each month
an£ since only a limited amount could be forced into circulation
it can easily be seen what a burden was placed upon the Treasury.
From July 1, 1878 to the middle of 1880 almost all the silver

and

coined stayed in the treasury vaults,/) only a small number of
certificates were out.

During the fiscal year 1880 the amount

of outstanding certificates was increased from $12,374,270 in
July to $51,166,530 on June 20, 1881.

This increase was duo in

part to the demand for notes for general circulation, but chiefly
to the operation of the departmental circular of September 18,
1880, under which exchange in the sub-treasuries in the west and
south payable in silver certificates was furnished free by the
Department for deposits of gold coin with the assistant Treasurer
in Hew York.

This policy called for a transfer of funds to dis

tant parts of the country.

Under this policy a large amount of

silver certificates had been paid out at the sub-treasuries, for
the seasonal moving of crops.18

After 1881 the circulation of
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certlf cates had Increased only slightly, but silver dollars were
piling up In the Treasury vaults.
The advocates of silver claimed that this troublesome
situation caused by the act was due to the Treasury policy*

They

argued that if the Treasury paid out silver, silver would be just
as good money as gold.

Pacts proved to the contrary, however,

for just as soon as silver began accumulating in the Treasury,
alarm was felt by the trade world.

The Treasury officials held

that if silver was paid out from the Treasury to meet the obliga
tions of the government it would be a virtual confession that the
gold In the Treasury was exhausted and that the silver standard
was in force.

T e Treasury was not lawfully forced to make

payments in gold, but in coin at the discretion of the Secretary
of the Treasury.

But in order to maintain the government credit

and tue confidence of the people, the Treasury Department was
obliged to meet the government's obligations in gold and in gold
only.

Resumption of Specie Payments
Under the act of 1875 the Secretary of the Treasury decided,
as a preparation for resumption of specie pa; ments, to build up a
gold reserve amounting to at least forty per-cent of the united
States notes outstanding.
In his report of 1877 the Secretary advised the creation of
a gold reserve of $120,000,000.

This amount, he said, would be

sufficient to take care of the United States notes outstanding,
the volume of which was to be reduced to $300,000,000 by a provi
sion In the Resumption Act of 1875.

Congress, however, in view

of the strong popular feeling against contraction of currency,
by an act aporoved May 31, 1878, forbade retirement of any United
States notes after that date leaving the amount in circulation
$346,681,016*

Since the policy of the Treasury was to keep a

reserve of forty per-cent of the notes outstanding, the amount of
the reserve was increased to $138,000,000,
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At the close of the year 1877 the gold reserve amounted to
$63,016,050, of which $15,000,000 was obtained by sale of four
and a half per-cent bonds and $25000,000 by sale of four per-cent
bonds, the remainder being surplus revenue.

According to the

Treasury policy this reserve m s too small and subsequently, on
April 11, 1878, Secretary of the Treasuiy Sherman contracted with
certain bankers In New York and London for the sale of $50,000,000
of four and a half per-cent bonds.

The bonds sold at a premium,

bringing the net proceeds of $50,500,000 gold coin Into the
reserve fund.

Another issue of $5,500,000 four per-cent bonds

brought the total bond sales for resumption purposes to
$95,500,000.

To this was added surplus revenue from time to time.

The amount of gold coin held in the Treasury as a reserve on
November 23, 1878 was $141,888,100 . 20
In

ntleipation of resumption, and in view of the fact that

the redemption of United States notes was mandatory only at the
office of the assistant Treasurer in New York City, it was deemed
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Important by Secretary of the Treasury Sherman to secure the
cooperation of the associated banka of that city In the ready
collection of drafts on those banks and In the psyment of Treasury
drafts held by them.

A satisfactory arrangement was made by

which all drafts on the Treasury held by them were to be paid to
the clearing house at the office of the assistant Treasurer In
United States notes? and, after January 1, 1879 Uhited States
notes were to be received by the banks as coin.

It was necessary

to secure this cooperation with the New York banks so that United
States notes would be accepted for payment as readily as gold,
thus lessening the burden on the gold reserve.

Everything was

ready and the outcome looked bright for the resumption of specie
payment.

Secretary Sherman, in his financial report of 1878,

made the follovdng comments:
”Every steep in those preparations for resumption
has been accompanied with increased business and confideuce.
The accumulation of coin, instead of increasing
its price, as feared by many, has steadily reduced its
premium on the market so that it is now merely nominal.
The present condition of our trade, industry, and
commerce, our ample reserve, and the general confidence
in our national financial condition seem to justify the
oplonion that we are prepared to commence and maintain r
resumption on and after the first day of January, 1879,
In order to establish confidence in the Treasury and to
clear up all doubt as to the meaning of "coin" as written in the
Resumption act, Secretary Sherman let it be known that the
Resumption act contemplated redemption in gold coin only.
On January 1, 1879 the gold reserve was 1133*808,800.
Treasury was ready to resume specie payments.

Confidence in

The
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United States notes was restored.

Even before that date, in view

of resumption, United States notes and gold coin were freely
received and paid in private business as equivalents.

That con

fidence in United States notes was restored is shown clearly by
the fact that from January 1, 1879 to November 1, 1879 the total
number of notes presented for redemption was only $11,256,678.
Aside from this very little gold was demanded on the coin
liabilities of the government during the period.

In the meantime

coin was freely paid into the Treasury and gold bullion was
deposited in assay offices and paid for in United States notes.
DuriniS that period the gold reserve increased from $125,508,804 to
$152,737,155.

This increase of some thirty millions Included the

eleven millions paid out in redemption of notes and proved further
tlie degree of* confidence the people had in the Treasury policy*22

Gold Reserve Established By Law
The first step towards the creation of a gold reserve was
made by Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch mhen ho pointed out
the necessity for keeping a large gold balance in the Treasury
in 1865-67.

Two acts determined what the size of the reserve

fund ought to be.

The first was the act of 1875 which provided

for tne resumption of specie payments,

In section 3 of this act

a reserve fund is tentatively provided for by authorizing the
Secretary of the Treasury to use any surplus revenues in the
Treasury foi future redemption of United States notes.

In order
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to further increase this reserve the Treasury resorted to the
hond sales provided for in that act.

The total ceaount of bonds

sold amounted to $95,500,000 and since th© coin (gold) thus
obtained could not be aoplied to current appropriations or for
anything but redemption of United States notes, Secretary of the
Treasury Sherman placed this gold in a separate fund designated
as the gold reserve*

He later suggested in his report to Congress

a minimum gold reserve of $1,000,000.2S
In 1882 Congress had, in a round-about way, established a
fund of $100,000,000 as a special and definite reserve for the
redemption of "greenbacks”*

This provision was embodied in a

bill to amend the National Bank Act, then under consideration in
the Senate.

The reserve was established in an amendment to a

section of the bill which related to gold certificates of deposit.
The amendment read:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
and directed tolpeceive deposits of gold coin with the
Treasurer or assistant treasurers of the United States
in sums of not less than $20, and to issue certificates
therefore in denominations of not less than $20 each
corresponding with the denomination of United States
notes* The coin deposited or representing the certlflcatestof deposit shall be retained in the Treasury for
the payment of same on demand* "24
Senator Aldrich amended this by adding a provision giving
the Secretary of the Treasury power to suspend the issue of said
certificates whenever amounts of gold coin and bullion in the
Treasury available for redemption of United States notes should
fall below $100,000,000.

After prolonged discussion Senator

Ingalls moved to change the word available in the foregoing
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amendment for the word reserved.

This was accepted, then the

provisions of the act were made mandatory by the change of the
word shall for m a y *25
Much of the discussion over the onendment centered upon the
advisability of a definitely fixed gold reserve.

The sentiment

of tiie advocates in favor of a definite reserve was expressed by
Bayard, Senator from Delaware.

He saidt

”There is at least one merit in the amendment of
tiie Senator from Rhode Island, (meaning Aldrich,; and
that is the recognition that there is such a thing in
the Treasury as a reserve fund to protect the Treasury
notesttn circulation.
’’There has been too much vagueness about the
thing, too much uncertainty. . . . I shall vote for
the amendnent because it provides for a reserve fund
beyond the power of the Secretary of the Treasury,
that it is there by legal recognition, and responsible
for greenback currency.”
The amendment passed and the Treasurer of the United States
put the sum of $100,000,000 in gold coin in a separate fund
reserved for the redemption of United States notes.

Thus a gold

reserve of $100,000,000 minimum became definitely established.’
^6

Financial Situation, 1880-86
Nothing serious had occurred since the Secretaryfs last
report to disturb the easy maintenance of s ecie payments.

The

only noticeable change in the Treasury funds was the gradual
increase of silver coin caused by the coinage of silver dollars
and the redemption of fractional silver coin.

On November 1,

1880, almost a year after the resumption of specie payments began,

the reserve was still Intact, standing at $141,597,013.

All

requirements of the Resumption act had thus been complied with.
Secretary of the Treasury Sherman expressed his confidence tint
resumption could be maintained*

He said, however, that if the

entire amount of United States notes outstanding was to be main
tained at par with coin, the reserve fund must be kept unimpaired.
Ordinarily the greater convenience of notes would produce a
demand for them rather than for coin, but if this proved not to
be tbe case, an ample gold reserve would safeguard redemption.
In a supreme emergency, the power granted to the Secretary of the
Treasury to sell bonds would supply any possible deficit in the
reserve.**7
The legal-tender notes, being redeemable In gold, could not
depreciate as long as the Treasury had the power and means of
providing gold for their redemption.

They, therefore, circulated

freely, and were used not only for banking purposes but were
absorbed In the every day exchanges as well because of their con
venience as for the fact that they could be readily redeemed.
The silver dollars, coined under the Bland Act of 1878, stood on
an entirely different basis.

To begin with, It developed almost

immediately after they were put Into circulation that the banks
as well as the public did not want this coin for their every day
use.

Thus silver began to clog the channels of public revenue,

which was the only outlet for the unpopular money.

As early as

1880 it was proved that It was almost Impossible to keep in cir
culation more than thirty per-cent of the silver dollars coined.
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The remainder had to be stored in the Treasury vaults.

Up to

September 30, 1881 over nlnty-eight million sliver dollars were
coined, of vshich only thirty-two million were in circulation.
The only outlet for silver seemed to be through Bilver certificates
which any holder of silver coin could obtain by demand.

Every

effort to put silver dollars into circulation was frustrated by
the speedy return of the coin for certificates.
■While the total amount of silver dollari^in circulation had
steadily increased, during the years 1880-85, the per-cent of
silver dollars in circulation, to the total number coined, had
drop ed from 30.8 per-cent in 1881 to 18.8 per-cent in 1885.28
In 1884 a commercial and financial crisis, the so-called
"panic of 1884" swept the country.
steadily piling up in the Treasury.

The silver surplus was
Foreign exchange was heavily

against the United States, and the security markets were greatly
affected.

The crisis was brought on by the heavy liquidation of

securities, and by the emb arras runent of several over-capitalized
railway companies.

This had been further aggravated, in February

1883, by the ill-judged hint of local Treasury authorities that
it might be advisable to force out silver through Treasury payments
in New York.2&
The panic was confined chiefly to New York.

The usual

symptoms in other panics such as the hoarding of money, a general
run upon savings banks, failure of banks, and suspension of
American industry were not present in 1884.

The Commercial and

Financial Chronicle of New York commented as follows:
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“Business in ail departments was suppressed and
results as to volume of trade and prices were unsatis
factory but all in all there was no real panic*
The
maimer in which business endured the money strain
proved, that the liquidating process, during the two
preceding years had been thorough* and that underneath
the crumbling structure of speculation wag a firm
foundation of genuine Increased wealth.
T e inflationists held that the fall in prices during this
crisis was due to insufficient currency.

On the othexfcand, the

Treasury reports showed that, notwithstanding the gold shipments
of the year 1884, the total supply of money in circulation in the
United States had increased by $435,000,000, or fifty per-cent
since the resumption of specie p a y m e n t s * ^
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CHAPTER II

FINANCIAL SITUATION 1885-93

With the election of Cleveland in 1884 the country passed
from the control of one party to that of another.

The financial

problems of the government were becoming more critical and it was
evident that the new administration would have to face a difficult
situation in dealing with the currency situation.
ginning to be widely felt.

Alarm was be

There was doubt in the minds of many

as to what C l e v e l a n d ^ plans were.

Under the Bland Act of 1878 the

government had already minted 200,000,000 silver dollars.

It had

exerted every effort to force that vast amount of silver into cir
culation.

Much of it was actually put into circulation, but

during and after the depression of 1884 it began to come back into
the Treasury.

Obligations of the government were being paid in

these dollars, while gold was constantly being drawn from the
Treasury by the use of both silver and greenbacks.

In other words,

the government was compelled to accept silver from its debtors
while it had to pay gold to its creditors.

Any other course would

have ruined its credit since the Treasury had to keep gold and
silver at par.
The sound money men, fearing that if the gold reserve once
dropped below #100,000,000 specie payments would have to be sus
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pended, believed that legislation to stop the coinage of silver
would alone arrest the danger.

They brought pressure to bear on

Cleveland and demanded that he come out in behalf of the gold
standard.

The supporters of silver were also making demands and

were bringing equal pressure to bear upon Cleveland.
conferences were held.

Many excited

On February 11, 1885, president-elect

Cleveland received a letter, signed by ninty-eight Democrats of
the House, expressing the fear that the banks and bondholders and
those having fixed incomes were making a united effort to commit
him and his administration against the continued coinage of the
silver dollar.

The hope was expressed in the letter that he would

not do anything that would place his administration in opposition
to the policy of the coinage of both gold and silver.

The letter

stated, also, that two-thirds of the Democrats in Congress had for
six years been united in defense of silver and would continue to
be so.1
As inauguration day approached the gold De mocrats, especially
the old leader Samuel J. Tilden, grew insistent that Cleveland
answer this letter and state publicly his determination to maintain the gold standard.

To Cleveland such a declaration seemed

unnecessary as he had already committed himself to a sound money
policy.

Eight days before his inauguration, however, he consented

to sign a letter prepared for him by Manton Marble.

2

In this

letter of February 24, 1885, Cleveland stated that in his opinion
a financial crisis was close at hand.

He called attention to the

fact that the vaults of the Treasury were heaped full of silver
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coins worth less intrinsically than eighty-five per-cent of the
gold dollar prescribed by law as the unit of value.

He added that

the sum of gold in the Treasury available for the payment of gold
obligations of the United States and for the redaption of United
States notes was already being encroached upon.

Going further, he

made his first plea to Congress for the repeal of the Bland Act
for the purchase and coinage of silver.

He said that to maintain

and to continue the use of both gold and silver at par, the pur
chase and coinage of silver must be stopped.3
There was no direct reply made to Cleveland's letter, but a
statement was published setting forth at length the views of the
supporters of silver coinage.

They argued that while it was true

that the silver bullion in the silver dollar was worth eightyfive per-cent of the gold dollar, silver coins which were admitted
to the same use as gold were equal in value to gold.

They held

that if the Secretary of the Treasury would pay out more silver
and less gold the reserve would be safe.

Since the matter was

entirely under the president's control, no obligations existed
which under our constitution were specifically payable in gold.
The belief was expressed that silver could not force gold out of
circulation unless an amount equal to the entire volume of gold in
circulation was forced upon the country by the Treasury,4
On February 23, 1885 the House committee on appropriations
inserted in the sundry Civil Appropriation bill a clause to suspend
the coinage of silver from July 1, 1885 to June 30, 1886,5

To

assist the plan of suspension, Randall, chairman of the committee,
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submitted a resolution to suspend the rules so as to discharge the
committee of the whole from the further consideration of the bill
and to limit the debate to four hours.

This time was to be spent

in discussing only the clauses relating to the suspension of silver
coinage and the world*s industrial Exposition.
defeated 118 to 15£.

The resolution was

The vote was accepted as representing the

views of a majority of the house on the suspension of silver
coinage.
Commenting on the failure to suspend the silver coinage, the
New York Chronicle said that business would be seriously affected.
This would be the natural result of the uncertainty of values
created by the continued coinage of depreciating silver dollars.
It was only Cleveland’s firm stand on the currency quest!>n that
put heart into frightened business men and cont nued trade and
production at the normal rate.
There was every reason to anticipate that sound and conserva
tive counsels would prevail during the administration because
Cleveland had expressed himself plainly on the leading issues of
the day, while his cabinet was made up of some of the ablest men
in political life.

Judging from the House vote on the suspension

of silver coinage, Cleveland’s problem was to secure the support
of his party for his sound money policy.

Condition of the Treasury
When Secretary Manning to k over the Treasury in 1885, he had
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a real task before him.

The situation was more serious than it

appeared to be on the surface.

Secretary McCulloch, preceding

Manning, had permitted his balance to increase during the last
month of his term.

He made no bond calls against the standing

surplus accumulating in the gold reserve.

The reserve fund,

therefore, was growing, but the policy of postponing the debt payQ
ment could be carried on indefinitely.
In spite of the efforts of the outgoing administration to
keep the gold reserve up, it had began to drop in the last months
of President Arthur*s term.

It went down from $141,000,000 on

January 1, 1885 to $185,000,000 on April 1, 1835.

Cleveland and

Manning recognized this threat against the reserve and began
adopting vigorous measures to protect it.

They permitted no bond

redemptions, allowing the revenue to accumulate in the Treasury,
and they used greenbacks whenever possible for disbursements,
Instead of using gold or silver certificates,

^hey also made

arrangement with the New York Clearing House to assist them in
keeping the existing stock of gold in the Treasury.

The results

surpassed all expectations.

At the end of the first year the
9
reserve had been built up from 125 millions to 151 millions.
During this period the gold reserve had fallen to its lowest
level since the resumption of specie payments.

As A.

s.

Hewitt

later pointed out in the House that the country had really stood
close to disaster in the early days of Cleveland»s administration.
He stated that to his personal knowledge, three great New York
banks had secretly accumulated more than $25,000,000 in gold in
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anticipation of possible disaster.

The crash did not come, he

said, "thanks to Grover Cleveland and that superb management of
the Treasury which has made the name of Daniel Manning famous
throughout the financial world
Since the fourth of March, the Treasury Department had been
admirably conducted.

Manning had reversed the flow of gold and

greatly strengthened national credit.

Before March 4, 1885 the

New fork customs receipts were practically all gold and its equiv
alents, but after that date the proportion paid in silver certifi
cates reached nearly 42 per-cent of the whole.

Under the policy of

Cleveland and Manning the per-cent of duties paid in silver certif
icates was cut from 41 1/3 in April 1885 to only 9|$ in September
1885,

After the first year of the new administration the gold

reserve was sound but the risks of the silver coinage act were
still present.

Until Congress repealed the Bland Act no revival

in business, except within very narrow limits, was to be antici
pated.

As long as compulsory coinage was kept up, confidence in

the stability of our currency could not be permanently restored.1^
The very success of the new Treasury policy angered the advo
cates of free coinage, for they would have liked nothing better
than to see the nation forced upon a silver basis,

Congress had no

sooner met in December, 1885, than there occurred a series of
attacks on the President and Secretary of the Treasury.

The whole

line of criticism was directed against the policy of maintaining a
large gold reserve and the administration’s refusal to pay out
silver.

Senator James B. Beck of Kentucky and Senator Eustis of

Mississippi, particularly denounced the policy of the administration
of lacking up so much money in the Treasury.

They expressed the

opinion that it was not necessary for the United States to retain
a reserve for the maintenance of its credit and the payment of its
cash obligations.

They argued that the government could just as

well pay its obligations in silver and by doing so it could relieve
the Treasury of its "burden”, as the gold men called the silver in
the Treasury.

The defenders of the government policy argued that

an ample reserve was needed and absolutely necessary to maintain
the government credit.

They held that any increase in the reserve

was a point gained in maintaining the credit of the nation,

In

answer to this argument the opposition contended that the resources
of the country were so ample and our credit so sound that there
could be no possibility of a demand upon the Treasury which could
not be met.
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In the House, Bland, Warner of Ohio, Weaver of Iowa,

and Bryan of Nebraska led a group of Democrats and western Republi
cans who accused Cleveland and Manning of working in the interest
of the eastern bankers and the creditor classes.

They denounced

the policy of maintaining a large surplus In the Treasury as a plan
to secure the favor of Wall Street and the banks.

They contended

that the money which was derived from taxes obtained from a hard
working people was held in the Treasury for the benefit of the
bondholder.

The whole Idea of the reserve was wrong, since the

bondholders were not thinking of the public welfare but merely of
the annual interest in gold they received from the government bonds
in their possession.13

Cleveland continued his sound money policy in spite of all
criticism.

In his second annual message he sharply challenged

Congress for being responsible for the silver surplus, piling up
in the Treasury.

He said in effect that every fair and legal

effort had been made by the Treasury department to distribute
silver currency among the people.

The withdrawal of United States

Treasury notes of small denominations and the issuing of small
silver certificates had been resorted to in an endeavor to accomp
lish this result, in obedience to the will and sentiment of the
representatives of the people in Congress.

In spite of this

effort, however, the silver was steadily accumulating in the
Treasury*

As further expressing the same views of his first mes

sage, In his second message he again recomuended the repeal of
silver purchase and silver coinage.

He salcls

nI again urge suspension on the grounds contained
in my former recommendation, reenforced by a significant
increase of gold exportation during the last year, and
for the further reason that the more this currency is
distributed among the people the greater becomes our
duty to protect it from disaster. We have abundance
for our needs and there seems but little propriety in
building vaults to store such currency when the only
pretence for its coinage is the necessity of its use
by the people as a circulating medium.
In his report of 1886 Manning assailed the silver act from
all angles.

He saids

nI have labored to promote the circulation of
silver with unremitting energy.
I have pressed its
circulation at a constant expense to the Treasury
when other forms of lawful money could have been cir
culated without such costs. Except our own, no mint
in the world which gives free coinage of gold now
coins full legal tender silver. We alone heap up the
load. Meanwhile what good hove eight years of it
done the silver owners?"!5
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The fact was that with some eight years of compulsory purchase
and coinage of silver the price had declined.

Furthermore, after

eight years of free coinage of full legal-tender silver dollars,
the people of the United States had used only 8,045,338 of the
total number coined.

Congress had already, since 187Q, required

the coinage of some 215,000,000 silver dollars.

In 1835 gold coin

still comprised QQ% of the metallic circulation of the United
States,16
On March 23, 1387 Fairchild replaced Manning as head of the
Treasury Department,

Fairchild, as well as Manning, recognized

the danger that existed in the compulsory coinage of silver.

He

put forth his utmost efforts in the hope of obtaining the repeal
of the silver coinage clause.
Secretary of Treasury Fairchild, in his report of 1887,
brought out a new plan to solve the silver problem.

His scheme

was to establish a $5,000,000 reserve of silver dollars and as
long as this reserve was maintained the purchase and coinage of
silver was to be suspended.17

This recommendation to Congress, as

well as many others, was not concurred in because of the strong
sentiment in Congress against restrictions on silver purchases and
coinage.
From the middle of the year 1836 for the remaining months of
Cleveland’s term the country enjoyed a short respite from monetary
disturbances.

The gold reserve remained well over $100,000,000,

being over 158 million on July 1, 1386j $168,000,000 July 1, 1887;
and close to or over $200,000,000 from then to March 1, 1889.13
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These large surpluses were not maintained without criticism however,
for the administration was constantly being assailed by members of
Congress.

Morrison led the attack in the House, and Vest the

attack in the Senate.

The whole attack was centered upon the

policy of a large reserve which the administration had accumulated
during the past year.

The opponents of the administration all

favored the plan of applying the large reserve or at least the sum
in excess of 100 million to the payment of the outstanding debt.
Weaver of Iowa said:
nWhat moral or legal right has the Secretary of
the Treasury to hoard in the vaults millions, yea
hundreds of millions, of money that has been drawn
from the people by painful taxation when interest
bearing debts are payable and due according to law.
It amounts to a misappropr i. at ion of public funus and
to the boldest kind of absolute tyranny
It was still further argued that it was not necessary to keep
any considerable reserve even for the purpose of redemption.

It

was also argued that nobody wanted greenbacks redeemed, that gold
goes ten times for greenbacks where greenbacks go once for coin.
Furthermore they held that the greenback was redeemable in coin
but not necessarily in gold coin, and that it was impossible for
silver ana paper to fall below the level of gold since the volume
In circulation was so limited.
In answer to these arguments it was shown that the gold
reserve was not idle but was, on the contrary, the busiest and most
useful fund in the Treasury.
t

This gold supplied the country with

a circulating medium three and a half times its own size.

It was

also argued that the balance in the Treasury was not as large as

34

pictured since many drafts and checks were always outstanding
against it.

On July 14, 1886 Morrison brought before the House,

from the Ways and Means committee, a report on the excessive sur
pluses held in the Treasury.

The report contained a joint resolu

tion requiring the Secretary of Treasury to employ all its money
over and above $100,000,000 in retiring government bonds.

The

resolution passed the House by a vote of 207 to 67, and it was
next amended and passed In the Senate by a vote of 42 to 20.

The

amended resolution as it passed the House provided for a 100
million reserve with a 20 million working balance, but the Secre
tary of the Treasury was required to retire government bonds with
all gold in the reserve above the smaller amount.
vented it from taking affect by a pocket veto.^1

Cleveland pre
In vetoing the

resolution Cleveland said:
"It is not a proved because I believe it to be
unnecessary and because I am by no means convinced
that its mere passage and approval at this time may
not endanger and embar’ass the successful and useful
operation of the Treasury department and impair the
confidence which the people should have in the_^
management of the finances of the government."''2
The Republicans regained the control of the national adminis
tration, and in 1889 William Windom became the Secretary of the
Treasury.

In the campaign of 1388 the Republicans had denounced

Cleveland1s opposition to silver coinage as an attempt to demone
tize silver.

They declared themselves in favor of the equal use

of gold and silver as money.

A clause in their platform read:

"The Republican party Is in favor of the use of
both gold and silver as money, and condemns the policy
of the Democratic administration in its effort to
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demonetize silver.*S5
When Harrison became president the supporters of silver began
an insistent demand on the party to redeem its pledge, and give
the country free and unlimited coinage of silver.
1889 a silver convention met in St. Louis.
territories were represented.

In November

Thirty states and

Fiery speeches against the capital

ists were made and a platform was drawn up.

*

The platform, which

Bland of Missouri wrote, demanded that the fifty-first Congress
open the Federal mints to the free coinage of silver, and that the
money so coined be made legal tender for all debts.
This was Harrison*s first administration and he had to think
of re-election.

The country was sharply divided on the question

and he dared not commit himself to either side.

He declared him

self in favor of the use of silver as money, but he also spoke
against this policy if carried too far.

In his first annual message

he said that he had always been an advocate of the use of silver
in our currency and that since we were large producers of that
OA,

metal we should not discredit it.

In his second message to

Congress he suggested an international council to consider the
question of the free use of silver as money and the adoption of
bimetallism as a desired policy . ^
With the president thus apparently committed in favor of their
theories the advocates of silver in Congress renewed their fight
for unlimited coinage of silver.
brought forward.

Many different propositions were

While some favored Secretary Windom’s plan of

issuing Treasury notes against deposits of silver bullion, the
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notes being redeemable in equal value of bullion on demand, others
insisted on free coinage and vowed they would accept nothing else,
A bill embodying Secretary Windom*s plan was finally agreed to in
the House,

The bill was amended in the Senate by the substitution

of a free coinage measure.

This measure oassed the Senate on June

17, 1890 by a vote of 43 to 24, but the House refused to concur.^®
The Democrats supplied the majority in favor of the measure, the
vote being 28 Democrats and 15 Republicans.

A long fight followed

and the free coinage men finally accepted a compromise measure,
the Sherman Silver Act, which was passed by both Houses and
a proved by President Harrison July 14, 1890.^

The act was a

Republican measure and passed the House by strict party vote.
count being 122 Republicans for and 90 Democrats against.
sectional vote is as follows:
Northeast
Connecticut
Delaware
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
Total
Middle West
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota

Yea
V2
0
1
5
0
4
il
15

Nay
1
1
0
1
O'
1
4

Not voting
1
0
2
6
£
2
18

4

8

1
40

0
0
12

1
1
41

12

4

2

a

4
2

8

l
0

1

6
6
3
1

3
0
10

2

i

0
0
0
0
2
0

2
1
4
2
0
0
1
9
0

The

The
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¥/isconsin
Total
Far West
California
Colorado
Nevada
Oregon
Washington
Total
Border
Kentucky
Maryland
Missouri
Tennessee
West Virginia
Total
South
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Virginia
Total
Totals
Northeast
Middle West
Far West
Border
South
Total

Yea
6

Nay
2

59

19

3
1
1
1
1
7

Not voting
1
26

2
0
0
0
0
2

1
0
0
0
0

6
1
5
5
1
18

3
2
6
• 5
1
17

1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

4

1
5

3

3
0
0
6
2
1
6
2
4
6
30

2
3
3
1
2
11

40
59
7
11
•5
122

■

4
2
4
3
6
2

5
7
40
12
19
1
18
40
90

1

41
26
2
17

30
116

Of the number counted as not voting , 112 were
pairea, leaving only four whose vote could not be
counted.
Adding the pairs makesi a total vote of 178
yeas to 146 nays .28
The essential provisions of the Sherman .
Act were that the
government was required toi purchase, monthly, at least 4,500,000
ounces of silver, at market price, to be paid for in legal-tender
notes redeemable in coin; and the coinage of silver, provided for
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In the Bland Act of 1878, was to be repealed after July 1, 1891.
Under the operation of the act the price of silver advanced
immediately after the passage of the law.

On July 14, 1890 the

price of silver was $1.08 per ounce; and by September 3, 1890 it
reached its highest point, $1.21.

After September the price

dropped rapidly until by November 1, 1891 it was quoted as only
S.96 per ounce, making the bullion value In the dollar but 74 l
cents.

The quick rise in price was due primarily to speculation* ^

The Sherman law brought about another peculiar result: imports of
foreign silver from May 1 to November 1, 1890, exceeded exports by
$7,750,000 while for the corresponding period a year earlier
exports exceeded imports by $7,860,000, a total difference of
$15,610,000.

In other words the Sherman act provided for the pur

chase of much more silver yearly than our total annual production
of the metal.31

President Harrison stressed the same point in his

third annual message to Congress.

He showed that the government

was buying and putting aside annually 54,000,000 ounces of silver,
which was 6,640,000 more than our domestic product available for
coinage.

In spite of this showing, however, the President reoom-

mended that the Sherman, la?; be given further trial.0
In his report of 1891, Secretary of the Treasury Foster re
ported a loss of $67,946,786 in gold by net exports during the fis
cal year 1891 and a gain of silver by excessive Imports amounting
to $2,745,365.

The tot. 1 amount of gold exported from February to

August 1891 w'as over seventy million.33

The chief cause for these

heavy gold exports was the financial stringency both here and.
abroad.

Up to midsummer of 1890 the year had been one of more
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than average business activity, but after that the outlook was not
so promising.

Agriculture was in an unsatisfactory condition,

overtrading and unhealthful expansion was apparent everywhere.
The banks of the country were unduly extended and the flow of
money to this country from Europe ceased.

Vast amounts of American

securities held abroad were forced on the New York markets in pre
paration for an expected collapse.

Aside from this there existed

a monetary stringency in England and Europe as well, caused by
failures of the Panama Canal Company, the Baring Brother’s Banking
House, and the French Cop er Syndicate.

As a result of these

failures a large amount of gold was needed at once and they turned
to the United States for it.

The financial needs of Russia and

the accumulation of gold by Austria-Hungary, with a view to the
resumption of specie payments caused a premium to be
exports and was an important cause of its outflow.

'aid for gold
Distrust of

our monetary legislation and the fear on the part of Europe that
we were drifting towards a silver basis* also had an important
influence upon gold exports.3'-1
To help relieve the stringency at home the Secretary of the
Treasury increased his purchase of United States bonds to such an
extent as to almost entirely exhaust the available surplus In the
Treasury.

From July 19 to November 1, 1390, over $99,000,000 were

disbursed in payment for United States bonds and interest in an
attempt to supply the country with a larger ctrculatIng medium.
It was apparent, however, that while the relief afforded was
timely, the unfavorable conditions were caused to a greater degree
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by a want of confidence than by a lack of circulating medium.
Throughout the period of currency difficulties the gold
reserve, although pared down considerably, remained above the
$100,000,000 mark.

It had dropped, however, from over 190 million

in 1890 to a little over U 0 million in 18918.So
In spite of the fact that the government was already buying
more silver yearly than the/country produced, the silver advocates
still clamored for free coinage.

They were not satisfied wita the

Sherman Act of 1890 and argued that it did not go far enough.

A

number of free coinage measures were introduced in both the House
and Senate in the fifty-first Congress but the bills died in
committee.

The silver faction was persistent, however, and kept

up their fight for free silver coinage.

Finally on January 14,

1891 they succeeded in passing a free coinage bill in the Senate
by a vote of 39 to 27.
mittee.

This bill was later killed in a House com

In the Senate debate on the bill the measure was supported

on the ground that there was insufficient currency to transact the
business of the nation.

They argued that the per-capita circulation

In the United States was only half that of France or England, and
that the country’s ills were due to this shortage in the circulation
medium.
In answer to the argument that the government was already
buying up the nation’s total silver product, the silverites cried
that it was more money in circulation that they wanted, not more
silver in the United States Treasury.

The sound money men met this

argument by showing that the circulating medium of the nation was
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gradually Increasing,

They argued that instead of aiding the

financial problem a free coinage act would merely flood the country
with a currency that would rapidly depreciate and lead to
disaster.*^

-
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CHAPTER III

THE GOLD RESERVE,

1893-1397

Immediately after his election in 1892, Grover Cleveland set
to work upon the problems which were facing the administration.
The western constituencies were demanding free silver, while in
the east public opinion was urging the repeal of the Sherman Silver
law.

To attempt repeal might disrupt his party.

The increase of

the public debt by issuing bonds to maintain a standard of value
would but add to the number of the silver support.rs.
situation was becoming a serious ore.

The

The surplus which Cleveland

had so carefully guarded in his first administration was gone.

In

the east there was a growing fear that sllv r would eventually dis
place gold in th

Treasury.

In the west, there was great dissatis

faction with the Sherman law, and some of the silver supporters
were determined to press their demand for free silver.

European

investors were thinking of ways and means to secure gold for the
remaining American securities held there.
products were decreasing and imports were

E ports of domestic
Increasing.

The future

of the currency and finances of the country depended on the action
taken by the new administration.1
Cleveland certainly needed competent assistants and wise
counsel during the coming years.

John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky,

was chosen Secretary of the Treasury.

He was wisely chosen as he
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had an admirable record in supporting Cleveland’s policy and
principles during his speakership in the House in previous years.
The gol

reserve had rapidly dwindled in the years of

Harrison’s administration.

This was due to the president’s policy

of redeeming government bonds at high premium in order to increase
the circulating medium of the country.

On March 7, 1893 when

Carlisle took office the reserve was only slightly above the 100
million mark*

&y arrangements with western banks it was then in

creased until, on April 1, 1893, it amounted to $106,891,000.

Out

the ’93 panic was on, shipment of gold to Europe incre sed, and
prices were falling rapidly.

Gold payments for customs and internal

revenue dues fell off sharply ana by April 18 the reserve nad lost
its previous gains.

The anxiety in the business world was great

when the reserve fell to only $100,000,000.

It was commonly

believed that the Secretary of the Treasury would soon cease making
golo payments.

In many newspaper,

appeared statements to the

effect that the United States Treasury officials were contemplating
redemption of Government bonds in silver.

To offset these reports

Carlisle made a public statement on April 20, 1893 that he had
paid gold in the past ana would continue to do so as long as he
had gold in the treasury lawfully available for that purpose.
said that no order had

He

been made to stop gold payments nor had

anyone been authorized to say that such an order would be issued.
He further stated that it was the purpose of the government to
preserve its credit unimpaired and to maintain the parity of gold
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and silver by all lawful means.
The result of Carlisle’s public statement,was far from being
satisfactory for it confined an unfortunate expression, indicating
that he would pay gold as long as he had gold lawfully available.
The question still remained, could the 100 million dollars of the
gold reserve be lawfully useo for redemption of Treasury notes.
The Secretary of the Treasury had not answered this question and
the public opinion was divided as to whether he meant that only
the gold not included in the reserve would be used in redeeming
Treasury notes in 1890,^

On A pril 22, notwithstanding the most

strenuous efforts of the Treasury Department, the gold reserve fell
below .100,000,000,^

Clevel .nd finally yielded to the advice of

the financiers and came to the rescue of theTreasury.

He authorised

a statement on April 25 which emphatically contradicted all news
paper reports concerning the policy of the Treasury Department.
He stated that the redemption of government obligations in anything
but gold had never been considered*

He insisted that the adminls-

tration was harmonious in its determination to maintain public
credit, to keep faith with the public and to preserve the parity
between gold and silver.

He further statec. that, with the confi

dence and cooperation of the people, the threatened dangers would
be averted, and he promised legislati n for a better anc sounder
f nancial plan. 1 Cleveland’s impressive declaration considerably
subdued the panicky feeling in the country.

The public was

satisfied that the administration was harmorjous in its determination
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to maintain the parity between gold and silver.
confidence was apparent in Europe as well as in

11

'|

The change in
rica, and this

was reflected in foreign exchange markets as well as on Wall
Street.

The feature of the week of June 24, 1893 was the ar ival

in New York of a shipment of #5 *0,000 in gold from London.

The

event was chiefly significant in show ng an improvement In the
condition of our foreign exchange.

The announcement of Clevel nd*s

polic,. had undoubtedly tended, in some degree, to revive foreign
confidence in American investments and led to a small but decisive
increase in. the sale of our securities in Europe.
yet, however, no assurance that the flow of gol(
would be continued.

There was as
Into this coun ry

6

In the meantime there occurred the panic of July, 1893.
Gold was being hoarded and money was becoming scarce.
failure

The Baring

in London, as h d been previously pointea out, considerably

aggravated the monetary stringency abroad.

The silver purchase

act of 1890 was inflating the cur ency by about 50 millions
annually and was bringing about a
from circulation.

arlced disappearance of gold

At the same time the Populist free silver

demands aroused fears in the East of a Western dominance in Con
gress and the consequent destruction of the gol
business

standard.

Many

firms began to i sue scrip in an effort to supply cir

culating medium.

Ahe Secretary of the Treasury authorized a

a further issue of national bank notes for the same purpose.
Between March 30 and November 30, 1893 m re than 134,000,000 in
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such notes were issued.

Ihl s addition to the curre cy was of

little aid, however, because it immediately went into hiding.7
In his December report the Comptroller of Currency expressed the
belief that it was not a lack of currency in circulation which
had brought on the trouble.
have given relief.

No additional amount of money would

As long as confidence was lacking and credit

declining, hoarding would continue and additional issues would
give little, if any, actual relief.8

Repeal of the Sherman Law

The financial situation was rapidly becoming critical and a
breakdown of the gold standard was threatened.

Conservative Demo

crats realized that to relieve the situation some change had to be
made in the Sherman law.
to 1893 had failed.

All attempts to repeal the law previous

The rapidly Increasing strength of the silver

faction in Congress had by 1893 become a real menace to the presi
dent’s policy.

Cleveland and Carlisle both understo d that the

fight for repeal would be a bitter one, but financial developments
were making it impossible to avoid the issue.

When the Sherman

bill became a law in 1890 not a single Democrat had voted for the
measure, but in 1393 the growth of the Populist party had under
mined the party and many Democrats objected to its repeal unless
a free coinage bill was substituted for it.

Cleveland was urged

to call a special session of Congress for the repeal of the

50

Sherman act.

Banks, trust companies and other corporations began

distributing circulars demanding repeal anc many chambers of
commerce voted resolutions asking for the same action.

The

silver supporters were likewise preparing for the struggle.
were not greatly impressed with the arguments for repeal.

They
To

them the whole demand was merely a plot of Wall Street and the
capitalists of the east.

They sent a host of speakers over the

country to stir the people against the repeal of the silver act.
Colorado, the center of thejsilver producing region, was naturally
the most aggressive in this ba tie for silver.

Their opponents

persisted in their efforts to get a special sesdon but Cleveland
still delayed action.

The party had been elected on a platform

promise of tariff reform and to repeal the Sherman lav/ might dis
rupt the party.
in C ngress.

Another reason for the delay was the opposition

Such influential men as Voorhees of Indiana, chair

man of the finance committee in the Senate, refused to take a
decided stand.

Cleveland stated, that it was because he could not

count on the support of Voorhees that he delayed in calling
Congress in special session.

Volney T. ^alott, an Indianapolis

banker, and a supporter of the Cleveland policy, assured Cleveland
that Voorhees could be persuaded into favoring repeal.

He said

that the senator would certainly listen to the importunities
coming to him from his Democratic friends in banking and business
circles in Indiana.

Ex-senator T. F. Bayard and Secretary of

State Greshem, both friends of Voorhees, also assumed Cleveland

——
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that Voorhees could be lined up behind the administration.

Q

The effects of the panic gradually spread westward and in
many districts, where free silver sentiment was strong, public
opinion was changing to a more reasonable attitude on the silver
question.

Many banks werejfarced to close their do rs and

financial stringency which followed undermined the determination
of those who had clamored for inflation.
Cleveland’s proclamation calling for a special session on
August 7, 1895 was issued June 50.

distrust and apprehension

c ncerning the financial situation, wrote Cleveland in his proc
lamation, had already caused great loss and damage, and the
crisis was largely the result of the o, eration of the Sherman
law.10
immediately after his proclamation calling a special session
Cleveland was secretly taken away, aboard a yacht, for a serious
operation.

Secrecy was necessary because Vice-president

Stevenson was a silver man, and with the possibility of his being
'.
President the announcement of C l e v e l a n d ^ condition would
undoubtedly have caused a new financial crisis,

fortunately the

operation 7ms successful and Cleveland’s health was completely
restored.
Cleveland opened the special session with a message that
was at once tactful and moderate,

h© began by briefly reviewing

the painful business situation caused by the sudden distrust as
to our monetary standard, and laid the blame for the whole

i
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situation on our unwise silver purchase legislation.

He showed

that since the passage of the Gherman law the government had
bought more than 5147,000,000 worth of silver and that many of
the notes issued for its purchase had been redeemed in gold.
Between M ay 1, 1892 and July 15, 1893 the notes issued in payment
of silver bullion amounted to a little more than $54,000,000 and
during the same per od about #49,000,000 was paid by the Treasury
in gold to redeem these notes,

^'hus the prospect of the complete

substitution of silver for gol

seemed to be impending.

The

redemption of notes in gold had already encroached upon the gold
reserve.

Thus we had made the depletion of our gold easy, and

had apparently tempted other nations to add to their stock of
gold.

This, he said, was shown by the fact that for theyear ending

•June 30, 1883, gold exports had exceeded imports by more than 87|
millions.

In closing, Cleveland declared that it was apparent

that the operation of the silver purchase law was leading in the
direction of a single standard and the payment of all government
obligations in depreciated silver.

He had called Congress, there

fore, to obtain the repeal of the existing law for the purchase of
11
silver.
°n August 8, Senator Hill introduced the first bill to repeal
certain sections of the act of 1890, and the bill was referred to
the committee on finance.

On August 11, ^ilson introduced a

repeal bill in the H o u s e . T h e n followed a prolonged conflict
between the advocates of the gold standard and their opponents.
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In the House, many lengthy speeches marked the debate.

Wilson,

Cochran, Reed, Coombs and others carried the attack for the sound
money supporters.

Bryan of Nebraska and Bailey of Texas led the

attack on the other side for the silver cause.

The chief points

made by these speakers were that demonetization favors the monied
class, that silver was a lawful money of the constitution and we
had no right to take it from the people, and that gold alone could
not furnish a sufficient supply of money to meet the necessities
of commerce,

Bailey quoted the statement of Alexander Hamilton

that to annul the use of either gold or silver is to abridge the
quantity of the circulating m e d i u m . H e

further pointed out

that there always would be difficulty in adjusting and maintaining
a given parity between gold and silver and he advocated free
coinage of silver as an aid in fixing the relative values of the
two metals.

He finally proposed to Wilson and those acting with

him that they join the silver bloc in permanently establishing
the equality of gold and silver and bind themselves to keep the
gold and silver dollar at the same intrinsic value.
Bryan gave a flowing three hour speech, championing his
cause.

His arguments followed the familiar lines.

He contended

that there was neither gold enough nor silver enough to form the
worldfs supply of specie.

He maintained that if the United States

would keep its courage, it could preserve the parity of gold and
silver at 16 to 1.

He said that repeal of the Sherman law points

to the burial of silver and to a single gold standard.
BIt leads Irresistibly to a universal gold monometallism:
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to a realm over whose door is written, Abandon all
hope, all ye who enter here.”
He said further that,
"If bimetallism Is impossible then we must make up our
minds to a silver standard or to the abandonment of
both gold and silver. Let us suppose that the worst
that has been prophesied by our opponents, namely,
that we would be upon a silver standard if we attempted
the free coinage of both gold and silver at any ratio.
Let us suppose that all our gold, goes to Europe and we
have only silver.
Silver would not be inconvenient to
use because a silver certificate is just as convenient
to handle as a gold certificate and the silver itself
need not be handled, except where necessary for change.
If, following out the supposition, our gold goes abroad
Europe will have more money with which to buy our ex
ports, cotton and wheat, cattle and hogs."
He said that instead of adopting a. gold standard in order to
trade with Europe why not reverse the proposition and say that
Europe must resume the use of silver in order to trade with us.
"But why adopt either gold or silver alone? ^hy not adopt
both and trade with both gold using and silver using
countries?"
In closing Bryan said,
"The last platform pledges us to the use of both
metals as standarqtaoney and to the free coinage of
both metals at a fixed ratio.
Does anyone believe
that Mr. Cleveland c uld have been elected President
upon a platform declaring in favor of the uncondition
al repeal of the Sherman law?
"The President has recommended unconditional re
peal.
It is not sufficient to say that he is honest,
so were the mothers who, with misguided zeal, threw
their children into the Ganges.
The question is not,
is he honest, but Is he right? He won the confidence
of the tollers of this country because he taught that
•public office is a public trustr, and because he con
vinced them of his courage and his sincerity. But are
they willing to say, in the language of Job, •Though
he slay me, yet will I trust him.’
"Whence comes this irresistable demand for un-

conditional repeal? Not from the workshop and farm,
not from the workingmen of this country, who create
its wealth in the time o1 peace and protect its flag
in the time of war, but from the middlemen, from what
are termed the business interests, and largely from
that class which can force Congress to let it issue
money at a pecuniary profit to itself if silver is
abandoned.
The President has been deceived.
He can
no more judge the wishes of a great mass of our people
by expressions of these men than he c.n measure the
ocean’s silent depths by the foam upon its waves.
"Today the democratic party stands between two
great forces each inviting its supports.
On the one
side stand the corporate interests of the nation, its
moneyed institutions, its aggregations of wealth and
capital, imperious, arrogant, compassionless . . .
"On the other side stands that outnumbered throng
which gave a name to the democratic party and for
which it has assumed to speak. Work-worn and dustbegrimed, they make their sad appeal. . . . They can
not pay for loyalty except with their suffrages, and
can only punish betrayal with their condemnation. . .
"This army, vast and daily vaster growing, begs
the party to be its champion in the present conflict."14
The chief argument used by the s o u t k

money men centered on

one ideas The currency famine, which the country was suffering
from, was the result of distrust in our monetary system, caused
by the increase of paper money and th

export of gold.

"Remove

the cause, the Sherman Act, and you will quiet the people’s fears
and with returning confidence the currency will again come into
its ordinary channels."10
"The

Sherman law has failed to accomplish the results

expected by those who formed it", said Wilson.

Going

further,

he said that it was expectec^fehat when the United States poured
over $4,000,000 legal tender Treasury notes, every month, into
the channels of trade, there would be a wholesome expansion of
our currency.

But, contended ?/ilson, Instead of expanding it has
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worked a harmful contraction of the currency,

*or every million

of Treasury notes thus poured, out more than a million of gold
has disappeared or gone into hiding.

He argued that the repeal

bill would bring about the desired parity between gold and silver!6
In answer to the plea for bimetallism, Wilson said:
"We are all bimetallists except the free coinage
silver men who are monometaliists, all for silver."
He also argued that there should be no fear of a gold standard,
since we have always been on a gold standard and on a single gold
standard since 1873$ and that the repeal bill does not demonetize
a single silver dollar.

17

in closing the debate for the supporters of repeal, Reed
gave tie following two reasons why he favored repeal:
"First it seems to me to be deeply settled in
the public mind from causes which can be eas ly under
stood, that the Sherman law is the cause of the un
reasonable hoarding of currency throughout this
country.
The popular mind is so filled with the Idea
that the existence of the purchasing clause of the
Sherman law is an element of disorder, that if we
remove it we shall do more to restore confidence
than anything we could do In the world.
"Second, when t h # l m e comes It will assist us
on the upward path to the next period of prosperity
and progress."18
Cleveland was pleased with the victory, which was even
greater than anticipated.

The supporters of the Sherman Act we e

beaten with the decisive majority of 131.

The Democratic vote

was 138 yeas and 78 nays and the Re ublican 101 yeas and 22 nays.
All the Populists voted in the negative, eight votes!9 The bill
was then referred to the committee on finance in the Senate.

The v o te by s e c t i o n s i s a s f o l l o w s :
Northeast
Connecticut
Delaware
Maine
Massachusetts
New Haapiire
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
Total

Yea
4
1
4
IS
£
S
S3
£8
£
£
97

Nay
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
—’
F
&T

Middle West
fllinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Total

16
13
9
0
10
6
0
1
1
19
0
9
84

6
0
£
8
1
1
1
5
0
1
2
0
27

£
0
0
0
0
1
3

5
2
1
1
2
1
12

Far Yfest
California
Colorado
Idaho
Nevada
Oregon
Washington
Total
Border
Kentucky
Maryland
Missouri
Tennessee
West Virginia
Total

9
6
3
4
3
25

2
0
12
6
0
20

South
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Virginia
Total
Totals
Northeast
Middle West
Far West
Border
South
Total

Yea
3
1
1
7
3
1
2
1
3
8
30

Nay
6
5
1
4
£
6
7
5
9
2
47

97
84
3
£5
30
239

2
27
12
£0
47
108

The Senate, meanwhile, had also been working on a repeal
bill, introduced by the committee on finance August 18.

That

bill contained a declaratory paragraph in favor of bimetallism,
but otherwise it was a sound repeal bill.

When the Senate commit

tee received the House bill they amended it before reporting it
to the Senate.

The amendment was In the nature of a substitute,

the co mittee having substituted the Senate bill for the u m s e
bill.20
The fight in the Senate was not so easily nor so quickly won
as in the House,

•‘■he free silver .orces were confident of a

majority and they fully expected to kill the bill.
the west were clearly divided.

The east and

On one side were Stoart, Teller,

Pepper, Jones, Vest, M organ, and Gorman fighting for the Sherman
act, while Morrill, noar, Voorhees, and McPherson carried the
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attack against the act.

The greatest argument used by the silver

supporters, which was merely a matter of interpretation, was that
repealing the purchase clause of the ^herman Act was not in line
with the platform adopted by the Democrats in Chicago, ^une 1,
1892.

They argued that the platform pledged the use of both

silver and gold as standard money o^the country; and to the coin
age of both metals without discrimination.

Senator Morgan was

particularly loud in concerning the repeal till because in counter
acted the pledge made to the people in his party’s platform.

He

said that there was nothing in the bill except the death warrant
for silver as a money m e t a l . M p t

arguments on this point, as

well as those of his collegues, had very little foundation.

T,e

very first sentence of the section of the platform referred to
opens:

**We denounce the Republican legislation known as the

Sherman Act of 1890 as a cowardly make-shift."2^
The Democratic party had pledged to repeal the Sherman Act,
.

and, furthermore, the repeal bill contained nothing as to the dis
use of silver as money.

Many compromises were proposed, but

Cleveland would accept nothing but unconditional repeal.

The

western senators stood firm against repeal but those of the south
and southwest were ready to yield.

A vote was finally taken on

October 50 and Cleveland won by a vote of 43 to 3 2 . The bill
was then sent back to the House for reconsideration.

On November

1 the House concurred by a vote of 194 to 94 and the bill was
signed by Cleveland the same day.2^
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Condition of the Treasury After Repeal

Contrary to expectations, the repeal of the Sherman Act did
little to lessen the burdens of the Treasury.

It did not relieve

the Treasury of its obligations nor die it restore confidence in
the ability of the government to maintain the gold stanuard,

On

the day the silver-purchase repeal bill passed the Senate the gold
reserve stood at 184,000,000.

Business and financial leaders grew

restive as the reserve continued to fall and they urged Carlisle
to replenish the reserve by bond sales.
Very little gold was being received from dues to the Govern
ment and it was therefore impossible to increase the reserve with
out resorting to the issue of bonds.

The Secretary of the Treasury

could issue bonds under the authority conferred by the Act of
January 14, 1875 known as the resumption act.

rart of the third

section of this act to provide for the resumption of specie pay
ments, which refers to bond issues, is as follows:
” . . . and to enable the Secretary of the Treasury
to prepare and provide for the redemption in this act
authorized or required, he is authorized to use any sur
plus revenues, from time to time, in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, and to issue, sell and dispose
of, at not less than par, in coin, either of the des
cription of bonds of the United States described in the
Act of Congress a proved July fourteenth, eighteen
hundred and seventy, entitled *An Act to authorize the
refunding of the national debt’, with like qualities,
privileges, and exemptions, to the extent necessary to
carry this act into full effect, and to use the proceeds
thereof for the purposes aforesaid.”25
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The act of July 14, 1870, referred to for a description of
the bonds authorized to be issued, provides:
•That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
authorized to issue, in a sum or sums not exceeding
in the aggregate two hundred million dollars, coupon
or registeredbonds of the United States, in such
form as he may prescribe, and of denominati ns of
fifty dollars, or sooe multiple of that Siam, redeem
able in coin of the present standard value, at the
pleasure of the United States, after ten years from the
date of their issue, and bearing interest, payable
semi-annually in such coin, at the rate of five per
cent per annum; also a sum cr sums not exceeding in
the aggregate three hundred million dollars of like
bonds, the same in all respects, but payable at the
pleasure of the United States, after fifteen years
from the date of their issue, and bearing Interest
at the rate of four and a half per cent per annum;
and also a sum or sums not exceeding in t e aggregate
one thousand million dollars of like bonds, the same
in all respects, but payable, at the pleasure of the
United States, after thirty ears from th^date of
their issue, and bearing interest at the rate of four
per cent per annum. . . .n
In his annual report of 1893 Carlisle asked Congress for
authority to sell bonds bearing a lover rate of interest than
provided for in the act of 1875, anc. running for a shorter term
of years?6
On January 8, 1394 a bill was introduced in the house to
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow money, but was
not reported out of the committee on ways ano means.
On January 17, 1394 the gold reserve was, after raany fluctua
tions, reduced to 169,757,000,

It was impossible to procure gold

to replenish the reserve without resorting to the sale of bonds.
CongreS'

had refused the Secretary of the Treasury the authority

to issue low rate bonds so, under the provisions of the 1875 act,
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$50,000,000 o f 5%, ten year bonds were issued andsold for
$58,660,917.65 in gola.^®

The first bond sale brought the gold

reserve to over 107 millions on March 6, 1894, the highest point
reached since March 25, 1893.
Treasury was only 38 millions.

The actual increase in gold in the
This small increase came about

from the fact that the subscribers to these bonds, in many cases,
obtained the gold they paid for the bonds from the Treasury in
oq
exchange for United States notes.
The first

bond sale did not pass without comment.

The com

mercial and financial centers were greatly pleased with the outcome
and praised Carlisle for saving the reserve.

The opponents of the

administration in Congress were loud in condensing the transaction.
They claimed that the Secretary of the Treasury had no authority
to sell these bonds.

Peffer of Kansas claimed that there was no

need to sell these bonds.

He said the Secretary of the Treasury

called attention to the fact that the high premium on Government
bonds at that time made him hesitate about issuing bones under
any circumstance and not until the pressure became so great that
the Go v e r n m e n t s credit, at the Secretary's opinion, was at staxe,
and that the Treasury was in danger did he ask for authority to
issue bonds.

When the authority was refused him he proceeded

without the authority to save the credit of the Government.
"There is no such emergency," argued Peffer, " . . .

how can

he speak of peril when there is nearly $140,000,000 of silver coin
and bullion in theTreasury besides the gold.

There is a great
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interest in the country that is demanding the issue of these
bonds", said Peffer, "and: humiliating as it is to make the state
ment, our Government is in practical partnership with that
interest.

I refer to the banking interest the brokers and the

speculators, and the men who gamble on the people's credit,

That

is the interest that is clamoring forthese bonds; and that is the
Interest which must be protected at all hazards though the rest
of the country may go to the dogs."
Peffer based his argument that the Secretary did not need
gold to redeem Treasury notes on section three of the Sherman Law,
which provides:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury shall each
month coin 2,000,000 ounces of the silver bullion purc ased under the provisions of this act into standard
silver dollars until the first day of July 1891, and
after that time he shall coin of the silver bullion
purchased under the provisions of this act as much as
may be necessary to provide for redemption of the
Treasury notes herein provided for."01
The silver supporters claimed that under these provisions the
Secretary of the Treasury had no right to redeem Treasury notes
in gold.

The Secretary of the Treasury had a dlfferant interpre

tation of the act, however.

He deemed it necessary to continue

paying gold for he believed that refusal to do so would indicate
to the public that the United States Government was on a silver
basis.
The reserve did not long remain intact, but it continued to
fall in spite of all efforts to preserve it.
it dropped to a new low of 52 millions.

On August 7, 1894

After t at date it was
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slowly replenished by voluntary exchanges of gold coin for United
States notes by banks and by small gold payments from the tariff
receipts, until it reached 61 million on November 14, 1894.

In

the meantime public credit continued to decline for there were
frequent withdrawals of gold fr m the Treasury by individuals
and Institutions win presented united States notes for redemption,
This gold was not exported but hoarded and thus steadily reduced
the circulation.

Also foreign exchanges were almost constantly

at or near a rate which made it more profitable to export gold
than to purchase bills of exchange, and conse uently these with
drawals continued to threaten the reserve.32
It soon became evident that a second bond issue to maintain
the public credit was inevitable.

On November 14 this bond issue

of $50,000,000 was offered to the public.

One bid was received
*7 * 2

for the whole sum and the sale netted $58,538,500.

The transac

tion did not stop withdrawals of gold for in December, 1894, they
totaled over 32 millions.

During January, 1895, withdrawals

amounted to over 45 millions.

This drain upon the reserve con

tinued until on February 8, 189S the reserve stood at $41,000,000.
'iluch of the amount withdrawn was not demanded for exports, but was
withdrawn for hoarding.

This fact seems tofurther establish the

conclusion that the people were becoming alarmed over the critical
condition of the Treasury*

34

The situation now became so grave that Cleveland called the
attent on of Congress to the subject by a special message January
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28, 1895,

In the message he stated that more than 172 millions

in gold, had been withdrawn in the first ten months, and 69 millions
more than one-third of the total, during thefollowlng two months.
He also brought out the fact that the silver certificates upon
which this gold had been withdrawn were still outstanding and
were available for use in repeating the process from time to time.
He said:
"The financial events of the past year suggest
facts and conditions which should certainly arrest
attention. . .
"An adequage gold reserve is in all circumstances
absolutely essential to the upholding of our public
credit and to the maintenance of our high national
character. . . .
"While I ’m not unfriendly to silver, and while I
desire to see it recognized to such an extent as is
consistent with financial safety and the preservation
of national honor and credit, I am not willing to see
gold entirely banished from our currency and finances.
To avert such a consequence I believe thorough and
radical remedial legislation should be promptly passed.
I therefore beg the Congress to give the subject
immediate attention."
In closing his message Cleveland asked Congress for authorization
of bond sales on discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and
that the United States legal-tender notes be cancelled as redeemed
and thus destroy the endless chain.

He also asked, in the same

message, t at the payment of all Import duties be required to be
be made in gold to assure a constant flow of gold into the
Treasury,35

Congress again failed to act on these recommendations

and Cleveland and Carlisle began hurriedly planning for a third
bond issue,

;
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The first question to be settled was whether the bonds should
be issued for public subscription.
certain to draw severe criticism.

Any other method would be
Cleveland and Carlisle were

reluctant to try any other method, but eastern financial leaders
advised them that with so little time available, public subscrip
tion would be hopeless.
$4,000,000 on January 30.

The withdrawals of gold were to nearly
At this rate in a few weeks more the

■i f •-

Govern; ent would be forced to default on its gold obligations.
On that same day, January 30, Carlisle sent Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Curtis to Newr York to see what could be done as
to the sale of bonds for gold.

Curtis conferred with several

bankers, with foreign connections, and reported back tout in his
opinion, from what he had learned, that bonds could not be sold.36
In the evening of the same day several newspapers published
statements to the effect that the Government was taking, measures
to obtain more gold.

These reports had an i .. ediate effect.

On

the 31st of January withdrawals dropped to $£,359,928, and on
February 2 withdrawals of gold dropped to $1,454,865.

After the

announcement by the newspapers that negotiations had been completed;
which, however, was not true, the withdrawals practically ceased.
In fact, about $1,800,000 in gold was returned to the Treasury.
The delay, however, in making public the official announceaient
that negotiations were completed, created so;ae uneasiness and
gold withdrawals began to rise again.

'7i7

In the meantime, Cleveland and Carlisle were hard at work
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The New York bankers were ready,

having been preparing to purchase the bonds since Curtis* visit
to New iork.58

On February 8, 1895, Carlisle opened negotiations

with a syndicate composed of August Belmont anc Company of New
York, Rothschild and O 0ns of London, J. P. Morgan ana Company of
New York and J. S. Morgan and Company of London.

The plan

as to

purchase 3,500,000 ounces of gold, at $17.80441 per ounce, payable
in thirty year, four per cent bonus.

One ounce of standard gold

was worth $18.60465, and the difference between that sum and the
contract price represented the premium received by the Government
on the bonds, making the price at which the bonds were sold
$104.4946.

At this price they yielded to the syndicate 3.75 per

cent per annum.

The specifications of the contract were that not

less than one-half of the gold was to be obtained abroad, also
that the parties of the contract agreed as far as lay in their
power to extend their financial influence against withdrawals of
gold from the Treasury, pending the completion of the contract.
With this contract the syndicate also obta ned the option to tahe
such bonds as might be offered for sale on or before October 1,
1895.39
The contract contained the following clause:
"The Secretary of the Treasury reserves the
right within ten days from the date hereof, in case
he shall receive authority from Congress therefor, to
substitute any bonds of the United States bearing 3
per cent interest, of whicn the principle and interest
shall be specifically payable in United States gold
coin of the present weight and fineness for the bonds
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herein alluded to; such 3 per cent bonds to be accepted
by the parties of the second part at Pgr, i. e., at
$ 18.60465 per ounce of standard gold.1,40
Before the contract was signed, Cleveland sent a message to
Congress in order that it might be offeree

the earliest possible

opportunity to take action on the above clause.

In his message

he gave Congress the terms of the contract and told Congress that
if it would agree to substitute 3 per cent gold bonds for 4 per
cent bonds under the privilege reserved, the saving in interest
to the government would be $539,159 annually or $16,174,770 at
the maturity of the bonds. 1
In support of Cleveland’s message Wilson of West Virginia
reported to the house, from the Committee on Ways and Means, a
joint resolution authorizing the issue of $65,116,275 gold 3 per
cent bonds.

The views of the minority on this resolution, upported

by Bryan and Justin R. Whiting were expressed as follows;
"The issue of bonds of any kind is only needed
to replenish the gold reservej and the gold reserve
only needs replenishing because the Secretary of the
Treasury redeems United States notes and Treasury
notes in thdfcind of coin selected by the note holder.
The note holder has no legal right to choose the coin
in which the obligation shall be redeemed but has been
permitted to exercise that right by a policy inaugurat
ed by the Treasury Department at or soon after the
date of resumption . . . We are not willing, by authoriz ag bonds for the purchase of gold, to pledge the
Government to a policy which discriminates aga nst
silver as a stancard money and recognizes gold as the
only money of ultimate redemption.
Do long as the
bondholder is allowed to ehoose the coin in which he
is to be paid, so long will it be futile to attempt
to maintain the gold reserve."
They further held that gold secured by Issue of bonds is at
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once drawn out. by those who are interested in having more bonds
issued, and that public debt is increased to the detriment of the
taxpayer aid for the benefit of those who desire a safe investment
for surplus funds.

They held that the only remedy is forlthe Sec

retary of the Treasury to redeem notes in silver when it is more
convenient|to do so.

They declared they would never authorize

issue of bonds payable specifically in gold.

The minority were

also loud in condemning the price at which the bonds would be sold
to a syndicate which was made up partly of foreign investors. 2
The resolution was then referred to the Committee of the
Whole and was brought on for debate on the following day.

Cleve

land was bitterly criticized for his actions by the opposition.
It was pointed out that Francis L. Stetson, counsel for Morgan,
who helped draw up the gold contract, was a former partner of
President Cleveland,

The President was therefore charged with

conspiring with his financial friends to defraud the Government.
In his fight against the bill Hopkins of Illinois contended
that, due to the low price at which the bonds were to be sold,
the syndicate w uld make $9,5000,000, in round numbers, when the
contract was signed, and, $18,000,000 at the expiration of the
period the bonds had to run.

In answer to the argument that by

authorizing the issue of 3 per cent gold bonds the Government
could save $16,000,000, Hopkins said:
"When the President sent that message to this
House and undertook to unload this contract upon Con
gress he knew that a majority of the Senate of the
United States favored free and unlimited coinage of
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silver, iie m e w that never c uld a gold bond bill go
tor ugh that body, to say nothing of the sentiment in
this House. Then why die he send that message here?
He sent it for the purpose of misleading the country.
. , . He made a contract with his financial friends,
giving t-iera tadenoraous profits that I have Inc tested,
and he desired by that message to mislead the public
and get the approval of Congress on the Idea th t
116,000,000 of interest would be save- by giving such
approval. . . . When President Cleveland penned that
message an; sent it to Congress it was not for patriot
ic, but political purposes.*
BWhat is this contract?* asks Bryan in his speech
on the; question of 3 per cent gold bonds,
*It is a
contract mad* by the Executive of a great nation with
the representatives of foreign mosey loaners.
It is
a contract made with men who are desirous of changing
the financial policy of this country. They recogni e
by their action that the United States has a right to
pay coin obligations in eIt xer gold or silver ant they
come to us with the insolent proposition, *w® will
give you 116,000,000 if the United States will change
its financial policy to suit us.1 “ ever before has
such
bribe been offered to our people by a foreign
syndicate, and we ought to so act that such an act
will never be offered again.
*We cannot afford to put ourselves in the'hands of
the Rothschilds, who hold mortgages on moat of the
thrones of Europe. , . • There is another objection
to this contract.
It provides for the private sale of
coin bonds running thirty years at 104* which ought to
be worth 119 in the open market, an which could have
been sold at public auctIon for $115 without the
least effort* Why this sacrifice of the interest of
the United States? The Govern .ent’s credit was not in
danger; the bonds of the United States were selling
in the market every day at a regular premium. , , .
We are told that we can avoid the sale of coin bonds
a t H 0 4 | by authorising 3 per cent gol bonds. What a
privilege! Why, it is less than three months since
ten year coin bonds were sold by the President at a
premium which reduced th* rate of interest to less than
3 per cent,
*Has the credit of the country fallen so ouch?
Nothing has occurred within three months, except the
President’s message, to injure the credit of the coun
try.
A vote was then ta :en and the bill was defeated by a vote of

167 to 120.45

The gold contract, held up pending Congressional

action, was then signed and put Into effect.

$65,315,400 worth

of bonds were issued to the syndicate and some $65,000,000 In gold
was received.

No gold was withdrawn from the Treasury to be used

In payment of the bonds as had been done in the two previous
cases.

No gold was withdrawn from the Treasury to be used in pay

until after the contract was completed.

The last delivery of gold

under the contract was made June £4, 1895, but the syndicate con
tinued to make deposits of gold in exchange for United States
notes until September 11, 1895.
$16,000,000. '

The amount so deposited was over

Soon after the contract was completed gold exports

began again to deplete the reserve.

On August 1, 18S5 the gold

reserve stood at over 107 millions but by September 14 it was
reduced to $96,000,000 and it was falling at the rate of a million
dollars a day.

Morgan publicly announced that the syndicate would

continue to aid the Government.

By October withdrawals had almost

ceased, but in November gold exports increased again and by Decem
ber the situ tion became dangerous with the reserve at only
$63,000,000,

The gale withdrawals for December alon^amounted to

$15,481,347.

The heavy withdrawals were due to manipulations in

foreign exchanges.

While the contract was In process of execution

the parties to the syndicate in this country drew bills of exchange
on their associates and others abroad and used them, tosupply
foreign exchange for the market in New York, thereby preventing
withdrawals of gold from the Treasury for export.

In this way the
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reserve was protected as long as the bills could be furnished, but
finally, when conditions had arisen under which it was not possible
to draw more bills of exchange without sending the gold abroad to
meet them at maturity, gold exports began again.

In his annual

message to Congress, December 2, 1895, Cleveland again appealed to
that body.
In this message Cleveland gave a resume of the legislation
relating to silver coinage.

He called the attention of Congress

to tire gold demands upon the Treasury and to the serious nature of
the difficulties encountered by the Government in its efforts to
maintain the gold reserve under the existing system of financial
legislation.

He said that those difficulties could be removed by

the retirement and cancellation of the greenbacks and the outstand
ing Treasury notes issued under the act of 1890, and he asked
Congress for this authority.

To Insure the cancellation of those

notes and also to provide a way by which gold might be added to
our currency in lieu of them, he asked that the Secretary of the
Treasury be given the authority to sell gold bonds, the gold to
be used for this purpose.47

Congress took no action on his recom

mendations.
Meanwhile the situi'on in the Treasury was again growing
serious.

The large and rapid withdrawals occasioned by the

scarcity of foreign exchange in our market soon excited feelings
of alarm and distrust in financial circles at home and abroad,
which made the situation extremely critical.

On December 20, 1895
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Cleveland sent another special message to Congress urging lousedirte
legislative action upon the subject.

In this message Cleveland

3a id*
"In ay last annual message the evils of our
present financial system were plainly pointed out and
the causes and means of depeletlon of Government gold
were explained. . * . The contingency then feared has
reached us, and the withdrawals ofgold since the
co ouni cat on referred to and others that appear in
evitable threaten such a depletion in our Government
gold reserve as brings us face to face to the neces
sity of further action for its protection* This con
dition is intensified by the prevalence in certain
quarters of sudden and unusual apprehensions and tim
idity In bus'ness circles. . . .
"The real sensible cure for our recurring troubles
can only be effected by a complete change in our finan
cial system."
In closing he asked C ngress not to recess before it had done
something to relieve the emergency.4 '1''
Ho legislation, however, was enaete ., and the financial
situation, instead of improving, was constantly growing more
serious.

The reserve continued to fall and in order to avert

disaster Cleveland and Carlisle began planning a fourth bond
issue.

The newspapers quickly reported that another sale of bon' s

to the same syndicate that had previously dealt with the Government
was being negotiated.

Cleveland*s opponents In Congress were

furious when they learned of the proposed action.

Many bills

limiting or prohibiting the issuance of bonds were introduced in
both houses but all were killed in committee* to which they were
referred.
On January 6, 1396 Carlisle issued a circular calling for
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subscriptions for $100,000,000 In United States four per cent,
thirty year bonds.

This circular was furnished to the public

press and printed in most of the newspapers of the country.

The

bids were made public February 5, 1896 and numbered 4,641, the
aggregate subscriptions amounting to $688,000,000.

Upon examina

tion of the bias before the awards were made it was found that
some of them had been made in bad faith by irresponsible parties
who had no gold nor any means offcrocuring it, and these bids were
thrown out.

The bids of some others were suspected not to have

been made in good faith, but the circumstances actually known at
that time did not warrant their rejection.

Among the latter

class was a bid signed "William Graves and Associates", of ^ew
York, for $4,500,000 which was first accepted and later thrown
out.

One bid from J. P. Morgan and Company of New York was for

the whole

100,000,000 at the price of $110.68.

After accepting

all higher bids, including the bid of Graves and Associates, and
a few small ones which were also afterwards forfeited for non
payment, there remained the sum of $25,179,850 which was allotted
to J. P. Morgan and Company.

When Graves and other small bidders

failed to comply with their bids the aggregate amount of their
bids, $4,736,000, was awarded to J. P. Morgan and Company, t :ey
being the next highest bidder.

This matter was made the subject

of a resolution of inquiry in the House.

Carlisle was notified

on February £6 that a House resolution provided for a committee to
investigate the alleged conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury
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in refusing to deliver to William Graves $4,500,000 in the bonds
of the United States and awarding said bonds to J. P. Morgan and
Company, notwithstanding that Graves was alleged to have tendered
the Secretary the amount of the bid for the bonds in gold at the
subtreasury in New Y o r k . O n

harch 7, 1896 in response to this

request received from Nelson Dingley Jr., Chairman of the Co mittee
on Ways and Means, Carlisle sent him a letter containing a full
account of the transaction.

In this letter Carlisle clearly

showed by duplicates of letters and telegrams Involved in the
Graves transaction that, as far as the Treasury Department was
able to ascertain, Graves had no associates and that he was wholly
unable to comply with its terms.

Carlisle stated that neither

Graves or anyone else tendered any gold whatever in payment for
the bonds, or any part of them, at the subtreasury in New York,
or elsewhere.

He said, also, that Graves had twice asked for an

extension of time.

Payments on the bids were due February 15,

1896 and on that day instead of receiving any gold from Graves,
he received a telegram from him in which Graves abandoned his
original bid of $115.2391, and prop sed to take the bonds at
$113.50.

Between February 15 and February 19 various letters and

telegrams were received from Graves.

No notice was taken of those

telegrams and letters for the reason tnat, according to the terms
of the sale, the time for receiving bids expired February 15, 1896.
In explaining why the bonds which were refused Graves were
allotted to Morgan and Company, Carlisle held that Graves had

...................

defaulted*

...............

1 ■■

He also said that if this bid of Graves’ had been

rejected at the beginning the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to award the bonds to the next highest responsible bidder would
have been perfectly c l e a r . A f t e r w a r d s Graves instituted mandamus
proceedings against the Secretary of the Treasury in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia.

In answer to the writ Carlisle

presented a complete affidavit in which he exhibited all facts and
correspondence relating to the subject.

The text of this affi

davit was much the same as his answer to the House Inquiry of
February 26, 1896.

The mandamus petition was promptly withdrawn

by the plaintiff upon the filing of Carlisle’s answer.51
YsThile the bond sale was being negotiated the reserve continued
to fall.

It reached a new low of $44,500,000 on February 10,

1896, but by March 31, 1896, the gola procured from the bond sale,
which netted $111,166,000, brought the reserve to $128,713,709.
No considerable variation in the reserve took place during
April when gold exports almost ceased but the export of gold was
again resumed on May 1.

^here was, after May 1, 1896, an almost

daily decline in the reserve until on July 23, It stood at
$89,669,975.

The bankers of the principal cities then joined

together in a movement for relief.

The result of this was that

the banks and financial institutions deposited gold with the
Treasury Department in exchange for paper currency and restored
tne reserve to $110,782,403 by August 4, 1896.

After the discon

tinuance of this aid from the banks the reserve began again its
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On September 1
Foreign

exchange shifted again in the latter part of August ana during
September a favorable balance in foreign exchanges checked the
outflow of gold and set in motion a rapid current in the opposite
direction.

By September 30, 1896, the reserve stood at over 184

millions.L2
During the month of October redemptions of United States
notes and Treasury certificates in gold were unusually heavy and
the reserve declined to $114,000,000 by November 5, 1896,

The

tide was turning, however, and the country was at last showing
increasing confidence in the ability of the Treasury to maintain
the reserve.

Diminished demands for redemption after November

1896 permitted an almost daily gain in gold.

The reserve continued

on its upward trend during the early months of the year 1897.

On

April 28, 1897 it had reached a total of $155,639,773,53
in addition to the gold procured through the sale of bonds,
the Treasury had secured $115,245,173 since May 7, 1893, in
exchange for United States notes, Treasury notes of 1890, and
other forms of currency.

The total amount of gold received during

Cleveland’s second term was $408,716,967.34
Although Cleveland had maintained the credit ofthe country
and had more than once restored the reserve, he was bitterly
attacked for the methods he used in doing so.

By a resolution of

May 7, 1896, in the Senate, the Finance Committee was ordered to
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investigate Cleveland’s bone, sales of the years 1894, 1895 and
1896.

The resolution called for a report on the effect the bond

sales had on credit and on the general business of the United
States.

Ahe committee was also ordered to inquire into the dis

position of bonds purchased by certain persons in New York; to
whom they were sold, and what profit was made.
On May 12 the finance committee a pointed the following sub
committee to conduct the investigation:
I sham G. Harris, Tennessee, Chairman.
George G. Vest, Missouri.
Ed. C. Walthall, Mississippi.
John P. Jones, Nevada.
0. H. Platt, Connecticut.
The first meeting of this subcommittee was held in Washington May
22, 1396.
gation.

Carlisle and Morgan were summoned to attend the investi
Morgan, who

as then in London, cabled that he would

return at once, and Carlisle set to work immediately preparing a
report for the committee.
On June 1, 1396 Carlisle submitted his report showing all
material facts and circumstances connected with the bond sales.
He explained at length the monetary condition prior to each sale.
He gave complete reports on each bond sale; to whom they were sold
and at what price, and defended the issuance of the bonds under
the Resumption Act of January 14, 1875.

In answer to the question

as to the effect bond sales had on credit ana business of the

United States Carlisle said1 in closing his report:
"I have the honor to say that, in my opinion, the
sales were necessary/for the preservation oi the credit
of the Government and the security of the business
interests of the people, and that they, in fact,
accomplished those results.
It is not possible to
state in this communication all the facts upon which
this opinion is based, but it may be said, In general,
that the effect of each sale was to restore confidence,
for the time being at least, in the power and purpose
of the Government to maintain its own credit, to pre
serve the parity of our coins and the value of our cur
rency, and to check the return of our securities in large
amounts from other countries for sale on the markets
here.
It can not be certainly known what would have
been the consequences to the credit and business int
erests of the people if the executive authorities had
made on effort to maintain the gold reserve held for
the redemption of our national currency and had per
mitted that fund, to become entirely exhausted; but it
is believed that such a policy would have subjected all
classes of pur citizens to great pecuniary loss and
distress.
At their June 12 meeting the investigation co .mittee, after
hearing Carlisle's first report, decided to call the Secretary
and have him examined.

The date for the next meeting, at which

Carlisle was to be questioned, was set for J one 15.

After so e

discussion, the committee decided to proceed to New York for
further Investigation as soon as possible after their meeting on
June 15, 1896.56
On June 15, 1895 the committee met again and Carlisle was
examined on the syndicate contract of February 8, 1895.

During

his examination Carlisle testified that the bonds of February 8,
1895 were sold to the Belmont-Morgan syndicate only because the
emergency was so great it was dangerous to delay and this syndicate
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could and would supply the gold.

On being questioned as to the

visit of Belmont to Washington about a week before the contract
was signed, Carlisle said that he did not first suggest the
transaction but the syndicate did make a proposition which was
not accepted.

The Secretary said that there was no legal obliga

tion upon him to call for bids, and, furthermore, Morgan and Bel
mont did not

orm the whole group taking the bonds, they merely

were the heads of a large syndicate.

In answer to questions as

to the price received for the bones Carlisle admitted tnat he
traded bonds for gold at less\than the market rate but this was
necessary because of the

excitement

and uneasiness in the market.

As to the Graves bid, Carlisle explained that he notified Morgan
that he was required to take those bonds and that Morgan had made
no claim for the bonds.

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

Curtis was next examined.

He was questioned wholly on his missions

to Hew York prior to the bond sales, both as to his authority and
as to his Instructions.

In his testimony Curtis said that he was

first sent to New York by Carlisle in January 1894.

His mission

was to ascertain the general situation, what the people thought
of the gold withdrawals and whether the people thought that they
would continue.

He said that he did see Morgan, Belmont and

others on other trips prior to the February 1895 bona sale, but
that he made no proposition to them.

On another visit to Morgan

on February 2, Morgan thought that they could get the gold but he
said that he was not prepared to make a definite proposition.
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Morgan and Belmont then came to Washington to see Carlisle.
Curtis testified that they did not bring a contract with tnem but
that the form of the contract care from the Treasury Department.58
The subcommittee then proceeded to New York for further in
vestigation.

Here, ten witnesses, including Belmont, Morgan,

Francis L. Stetson, William Graves, ^ohn A. Stewart, Conrad Jordan,
Henry Chapin Jr., James T, Woodward, Harlan A. Whipple, and James
Irvine were summoned and examined.
Investigation.

Nothing resulted from trie

The committee had tried to prove that there had

been a plot involving President Cleveland and Secretary Carlisle
and certain eastern bankers,

^elmont and Morgan declined to

answer any questions that dealt with the disposal of the bonds
and prices received for them.

This refusal was based on their

claim that the committee could not force them to reveal private
business transactions.

Their position was correct for the statute

in regard to recalcitrant witnesses before Congressional committees
applied only to hearings in the District of Columbia.

On June £0

the committee adjourned and returned to Washington.5^
When this subcommittee returned to Washington it reported to
the whole committee what was done, or rather, what could not be
done.

No further business was transacted other than the printing

of the testimony received from the witnesses.

The report was made

to the Senate on March 2, 1897, when Peffer*s resolution, submit
ted to that body February 7, 1897, was brought before the Senate.
The resolution is as follows:

Resolved.
"That the Commitc.ee on Finance be, and
it is hereby instructed to report to the Senate curing
the present session of Congress what action the said
committee has taken in the matter of the investigation
under the resolution adopted in the last session of
Congress directing an investigation of bond sales of
the Secretary of the Treasury.
In the short debate which followed it was brought out that
the subcommittee had not agreed on a report.

Senator Aldrich

reported that Harris, who was Chairman of the subcommittee

was ill

and that he was not attending that session, therefore no report
could be given.

Vest, who did most of the questioning of the

witnesses, said in his brief report that the main purpose of the
investigation was to find if any of the bonds purchased by the
syndicate were sold to any Government officials, ana at what
price.

He said that the subcommittee endeavored to comply with

instructions, but since the witnesses declined to answer and
since they were unable to make them answer there was nothing left
for the subcommittee to do except to return and report the refusal
of those witnesses to answer those questions.

He said, however,

that the minority of the subcommittee suggested to the whole com
mittee that the witnesses be subpoened and tried before the Senate
bar where the witnesses could be held for contempt if they refused
to answer the questions.®^

But It was pointed out by Hill of New

York, who called the investigation a farce in the first place,
that bringing the witnesses to Washington would serve no
because they coulc not be forced to answer.

urpose

He said further that

some member of the Government had to be definitely charged with

having received bonds before the witnesses could be forced to
answer any questions involving that official.

Since no one was

charged with having done wrong, further investigation was but a
gn
waste of time and money.
When Cleveland and Carlisle retired at the end of the term
they were probably the most unpopular men in the. South and West.
For four1 years Cleveland had struggled against heavy odds.

His

party was broken up by the Populists, led by Bryan, who were a
constant obstacle in his effort to maintain the gold standard.
He had forced through Congress the repeal of the silver purchase
act, insisting that the country was In peril.

With all the

resources of patronage ana social power in his hands, Cleveland
did not use them in this conflict.
In his fight to preserve the gold reserve, and the gold
standard, Cleveland lost the support of his party.

He had the

satisfaction, however, of knowing that he had maintained the
existing standard of value and had lived to see the end of the
free silver fallacy, which later gripped the West and South.
While Cleveland’s whole policy, including the bond sales, can be
justified only on the basis of the emergency, it was evident that
the majority in Congress wa3 ever ready to criticize and was quite
Ignorant of the real conuition.
When Congress assembled in 1893 the country was in the throes
of a panic.

The stringency on the money market was great, so

naturally the money question was paramount.
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Botn Democrats and
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Republicans had for years been coquetting with the free silver
craze.

Both parties were divided on it.

The increasing amount

of silver in the Treasury was driving out gold.

Congress failed

to give the relief he had asked for, and Cleveland was forced to
rely entirely on his own resources.

He maintained the gold

reserve by his sale of bond issues, one after the other.

By this

means, alone, he was able to restore confidence and avoid loss of
national credit.
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